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Abstract— Motivated by recent works addressing adversarial
attacks on deep reinforcement learning, a deception attack on
linear quadratic Gaussian control is studied in this paper. In
the considered attack model, the adversary can manipulate
the observation of the agent subject to a mutual information
constraint. The adversarial problem is formulated as a novel
dynamic cheap talk game to capture the strategic interaction
between the adversary and the agent, the asymmetry of infor-
mation availability, and the system dynamics. Necessary and
sufficient conditions are provided for subgame perfect equilibria
to exist in pure strategies and in behavioral strategies; and char-
acteristics of the equilibria and the resulting control rewards
are given. The results show that pure strategy equilibria are
informative, while only babbling equilibria exist in behavioral
strategies. Numerical results are shown to illustrate the impact
of strategic adversarial interaction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) has recently emerged
as a promising solution for solving large Markov decision
processes (MDPs) and partially observable MDPs (POMDPs),
thanks to deep neural networks used as policy approxima-
tors [1]. DRL has, however, been shown to be vulnerable to
small perturbations of the state observation, called adversarial
examples, which were found to mislead the control agent to
take suboptimal control actions [2]. While there has been a
significant recent interest in the design of adversarial examples
against DRL [2], [3], [4], [5], [8], there has been little work
on characterizing the ability of agents to adapt to those.
Recent work proposed to use adversarial examples for
making DRL agents more robust to perturbations, by letting
the adversary and the agent play against each other, and
formulating the interaction as a stochastic game (SG) [7].
Nonetheless, in the case of adversarial examples the agent
cannot observe the system state directly, and hence the SG
model does not capture the information structure of the
problem. Effectively, adversarial examples make that the
agent has to solve a POMDP, where the observations are
subverted by the adversary so as to mislead the agent.
As a model of this interaction, in this paper we propose
a game theoretical model to study the strategic interaction
between an agent that has to solve a linear quadratic Gaussian
(LQG) control problem, and an adversary that can manipulate
the agent’s observations by an affine random transformation
subject to a mutual information constraint, and aims at
minimizing the control reward. The resulting problem is
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formulated as a dynamic cheap talk game, which captures
information asymmetry, the beliefs of the adversary and the
agent, and the undetectability constraints imposed on the
adversarial attacks.
Our paper addresses two problems. First, we address
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs) in pure strategies and
in behavioral strategies, and we characterize the equilibrium
strategies. Second, we characterize the rewards achievable
in equilibria, and relate them to the rewards of a naive
agent and an alert agent under attack. The key novelty
of our contribution is that we characterize the strategies
to be followed by the agent and by the adversary under
strategic interaction, which has not been addressed by existing
literature.
Previous work studied robust POMDP under uncertainty of
the system dynamics [6]. The control action was optimized
under the worst-case assumption of the system dynamics in
each stage, i.e., the agent plays as the leader and the dynamic
system plays as the follower in a Stackelberg game. SG and
partially observable SG (POSG) were used to model the
strategic interaction of players in a dynamic system, and have
been employed in robust and adversarial problems [7], [8], [9].
But unlike in the case of learning under adversarial attacks, in
SG and in POSG the players interact with each other through
the impact of their actions on the state transitions, not on
the state observations. Our work is related to the cheap talk
game [18], where a sender with private information sends
a message to a receiver and the receiver takes an action
based on the received message and based on its belief on the
inaccessible private information. Closest to our model are [10],
where a dynamic cheap talk game was proposed to study a
deception attack on a Markovian system, i.e., the actions do
not affect the state transitions, [11], where a dynamic game
was used to model the attacker-defender interaction, and the
optimal attack strategy was characterized allowing for a static
optimal defense strategy, and our preliminary work [12],
where a dynamic cheap talk framework was proposed to
model deception attacks on a general MDP.
Adversarial variants of LQG control were considered in a
number of recent works. A Stackelberg game was formulated
in [13], where the dynamic system is the leader, while the
agent is the follower and may be an adversary. The authors
formulated a finite horizon hierarchical signaling game
between the sender and the receiver in a dynamic environment
and showed that linear sender and receiver strategies can
yield the equilibrium [14]. In [15], the opposite problem
was studied but without considering the complete strategic
interaction, where the adversary optimally manipulates the
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Fig. 1. Considered adversarial attack on dynamic system control. In the
i-th stage, the adversary observes the true system state si and presents the
manipulated state sˆi to the agent. The agent does not have access to the true
state si but takes an action ai upon observing sˆi.
control actions instead of the system states. The optimal
attack on both the system state and the control action in LQG
control was studied in [16]. In [17], a targeted attack strategy
was studied to mislead the LQG system to a particular state
while evading detection.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we present the system model and problem formulation. In
Section III we provide analytical results. In Section IV we
provide numerical results. Section V concludes the paper.
Notation: Unless otherwise specified, we denote a ran-
dom variable by a capital letter and its realization by the
corresponding lower-case letter. We denote by N (·, ·) the
Gaussian distribution, by S(·) the support set, by I(·; ·) the
mutual information, and by || · || the cardinality of a set.
II. ADVERSARIAL LQG CONTROL PROBLEM
We consider an N-stage LQG control problem under
adversarial attack, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The system states
{si}Ni=1, the manipulated states {sˆi}Ni=1, the actions {ai}Ni=1,
and the instantaneous rewards {ri}Ni=1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N are
described by
si+1 = αisi+βiai+ zi, given αi 6= 0, βi 6= 0; (1)
sˆi = piisi+ ci; (2)
ai = κisˆi+ρi; (3)
ri = Ri(si,ai) =−θis2i −φia2i , given θi > 0, φi > 0; (4)
S1 ∼ b1 ,N (µ1,σ21 ), given µ1, σ21 > 0; (5)
Zi ∼N (0,ω2i ), given ω2i > 0; (6)
Ci ∼N (0,δ 2i ). (7)
A. LQG Recapitulation
If {pii}Ni=1 and {δ 2i }Ni=1 are known by the agent, the above
problem is a standard LQG control. In the i-th stage, the
agent observes sˆi but not si, and determines the action ai
with the aim to maximize its expected accumulated reward.
Note that it is sufficient to consider an affine function of sˆi
for ai in the standard LQG problem as the optimal action
a?i is a linear function of the mean of the Gaussian posterior
distribution of Si for the agent after observing {sˆk}ik=1 and
{ak}i−1k=1 [20]. To compute the optimal coefficients κ?i and ρ?i ,
we first define θ˜N+1 = 0, and for 1≤ i≤ N define θ˜i as
θ˜i = θi+ θ˜i+1α2i −
θ˜ 2i+1α
2
i β 2i
φi+ θ˜i+1β 2i
. (8)
Furthermore, we denote by bi ,N (µi,σ2i ) the belief of the
agent about Si, which is the Gaussian posterior distribution of
Si for the agent after observing {sˆk}i−1k=1 and {ak}i−1k=1. Then,
given the manipulated state sˆi, the optimal action can be
expressed as
κ?i =−
θ˜i+1αiβipiiσ2i
(φi+ θ˜i+1β 2i )(pi2i σ2i +δ 2i )
, (9)
ρ?i =−
θ˜i+1αiβiµiδ 2i
(φi+ θ˜i+1β 2i )(pi2i σ2i +δ 2i )
, (10)
a?i = κ
?
i sˆi+ρ
?
i =−
θ˜i+1αiβi
φi+ θ˜i+1β 2i
piiσ2i sˆi+µiδ 2i
pi2i σ2i +δ 2i
, (11)
where the coefficients κ?i and ρ?i depend on bi;
piiσ2i sˆi+µiδ
2
i
pi2i σ
2
i +δ
2
i
is
the mean of the Gaussian posterior distribution of Si for the
agent after observing {sˆk}ik=1 and {ak}i−1k=1. Note that when
pii ≡ 1 and δ 2i ≡ 0 the LQG strategy reduces to the linear
quadratic regulator (LQR) strategy
(κ?i ,ρ
?
i ) =
(
− θ˜i+1αiβi
φi+ θ˜i+1β 2i
,0
)
. (12)
B. Adversarial Model
The adversary can manipulate the observation of the
agent and its objective is to minimize the agent’s expected
accumulated reward, similar to [2], [5]. In the i-th stage,
the adversary chooses the manipulation parameters pii, δ 2i ,
manipulates the state si to sˆi, and then reports the manipulated
state sˆi to the agent. We consider that the adversarial
manipulation is “small”, since a large manipulation may
be easily detected and may also involve a high manipulation
cost. Given the agent’s belief bi ,N (µi,σ2i ), we impose the
following constraints on the manipulation:
−∞< ε ′ ≤ pii ≤ ε < ∞; (13)
I(Sˆi;Si) =
1
2
log
pi2i σ2i +δ 2i
δ 2i
≥ 1
2
logλ > 0, ∀pii,δ 2i , (14)
i.e., pi
2
i σ
2
i +δ
2
i
δ 2i
≥ λ > 1. The mutual information constraint (14)
implies that the manipulated state conveys at least a certain
amount of information about the system state to the agent.
A larger value of λ means a weaker adversary, and vice
versa. Note that in order to satisfy the mutual information
constraint, the adversary cannot use pii = 0. We denote by
Ai(bi,ε ′,ε,λ ) the set of feasible adversarial actions (pii,δ 2i )
in the i-th stage subject to (13)-(14). Finally, in the end of
this stage, the adversary reveals pii, δ 2i to the agent1, so as
to keep the adversarial model consistent with the standard
LQG control.
C. Adversarial LQG Control Game
In every stage of the adversarial problem, there is a cheap
talk interaction, where the adversary acts as the sender and the
agent as the receiver. Different from the dynamic cheap talk
1This assumption is strong but may hold in some cases. For instance, the
player in the shell game reveals the cup in which the pellet is after each
round.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of information structure for a three-stage ALQG game.
game with an action-independent Markovian system [10],
we propose a novel dynamic cheap talk game to model
the strategic interaction of the adversary and the agent
with asymmetric information in the adversarial LQG control
problem. Unlike in recent works on adversarial reinforcement
learning [2], [3], [4], [5], in our model of strategic interaction
the agent is aware of and can adapt to the adversary.
The game is played between the adversary and the agent
over N stages. In the i-th stage, the belief of the agent
bi is known to the adversary and determines the action
set Ai(bi,ε ′,ε,λ ). The adversary uses a behavioral strategy
gi(pii,δ 2i |bi) over Ai(bi,ε ′,ε,λ ) for choosing (pii, δ 2i ). Then,
given the observed system state si it generates the manipulated
state sˆi with the probability measure N (sˆi|piisi,δ 2i ). The
agent uses a pure strategy2 fi(bi) for choosing κi and ρi
based on the belief bi, and takes the action ai = κisˆi + ρi
once it receives the manipulated state sˆi. Finally, the players
compute the belief bi+1,N (µi+1,σ2i+1) based on the current
belief bi, the coefficient pii, the variance δ 2i , the manipulated
state sˆi, and the action ai as µi+1 = Λµ(bi,pii,δ 2i , sˆi,ai) and
σ2i+1 = Λν(bi,pii,δ
2
i ).
We can thus express the expected accumulated agent reward
using the adversarial strategies gN , (g1, . . . ,gN) and the
agent’s strategies fN , ( f1, . . . , fN) over N stages as
V
(
b1,gN , fN
)
= Eb1,gN , fN
(
N
∑
j=1
R j(S j,A j)
)
. (15)
Consequently, the objective of the adversary is to mini-
mize (15), while the agent aims at maximizing it. We refer to
this particular dynamic cheap talk game as adversarial LQG
(ALQG) game. Fig. 2 illustrates a three-stage ALQG game.
Our objective is to characterize SPEs in the ALQG game:
the existence conditions and solution structures.
Remark 1: The adversarial LQG problem cannot be mod-
eled as an SG or a POSG, since the adversary directly ma-
nipulates the observation of the agent. Furthermore, different
from zero-sum SG, an SPE of the ALQG game does not
necessarily exist. On the other hand, for N = 1 the game is
a cheap talk game [18], where the strategies of both players
depend on the belief of the agent and on the constraints on the
adversarial manipulation. Nonetheless, in the ALQG game
2The following analysis will show that it is sufficient to consider a pure
agent strategy with an affine form.
the reward function is different from that in [18], which gives
rise to different equilibria, as we will show later.
III. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In the following, we first formulate the value function and
the belief update rule for the adversarial LQG problem; we
then characterize SPEs in pure strategies and in behavioral
strategies, respectively.
A. Value Function and Belief Update
Assume that there is an SPE consisting of strategies
(gN∗, fN∗). Induced by this SPE, we can define the value
function of a subgame starting from the i-th stage as
VNi (bi) =V (bi,g
N∗
i , f
N∗
i ) = Ebi,gN∗i , fN∗i
(
N
∑
j=i
R j(S j,A j)
)
,
(16)
i.e., the value function VNi (bi) is the expected accumulated
agent reward in the subgame starting from the i-th stage
when the belief in the i-th stage is bi and the SPE strategies
(gN∗i , f
N∗
i ) are used. The evaluation of V
N
i (bi) needs the
beliefs in the subgame. In the following, we specify the
belief update rule.
Given the current belief bi ,N (µi,σ2i ), the coefficient pii,
the variance δ 2i , the manipulated state sˆi, and the action ai,
it follows from the adversarial LQG model and Bayes rule
that bi+1 ,N (µi+1,σ2i+1) with
µi+1 = Λµ(bi,pii,δ 2i , sˆi,ai) = αi
piiσ2i sˆi+µiδ 2i
pi2i σ2i +δ 2i
+βiai, (17)
σ2i+1 = Λν(bi,pii,δ
2
i ) =
α2i σ2i δ 2i
pi2i σ2i +δ 2i
+ω2i . (18)
An immediate consequence of the belief update rule is the
following.
Property 1: It follows from σ21 > 0, the variance update
rule (18), and pii 6= 0 that σ2i > 0 for all 1≤ i≤ N.
Observe that the value functions {VNi }N−1i=1 have to satisfy
the backward dynamic programming equation
VNi (bi) = mingi
Ebi,gi, f ∗i {Ri(Si,Ai)
+VNi+1(N (Λµ(bi,Πi,∆
2
i , Sˆi,Ai),Λν(bi,Πi,∆
2
i )))}
= max
fi
Ebi,g∗i , fi{Ri(Si,Ai)
+VNi+1(N (Λµ(bi,Πi,∆
2
i , Sˆi,Ai),Λν(bi,Πi,∆
2
i )))}.
(19)
Thus the SPE has to satisfy (19), which is the basis for the
analysis we present in the following.
B. Pure Strategy Equilibria
We start the analysis considering pure strategy equilibria.
With slight abuse of notation, we denote by (pii,δ 2i ) = gi(bi)
a pure strategy of the adversary as a function of the belief bi.
We first consider the case N = 1.
Proposition 1: Let N = 1. An SPE consists of ( f ∗1 ,g
∗
1),
where (κ∗1 ,ρ
∗
1 ) = f
∗
1 (b1) = (0,0) for any belief b1; and g
∗
1
can be any adversarial strategy defined on A1(b1,ε ′,ε,λ ).
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Proof: Observe that (κ∗1 ,ρ
∗
1 ) = f
∗
1 (b1) = (0,0) is a
dominant strategy for the agent for any belief b1. Under
this strategy, the adversarial strategy has no impact on the
agent’s reward. This proves the result.
While the result for N = 1 may seem trivial, for N ≥ 2 an
SPE may not exist as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Let N ≥ 2. If ε ′ 6= ε or if ε ′= ε = 0, then there
is no pure strategy SPE for the ALQG game. If ε ′ = ε 6= 0,
then there is a unique pure strategy SPE. The SPE strategies
for 1≤ i≤ N are given by
θ˜N+1 = θˆN+1 = 0; (20)
θ˜i = θi+ θ˜i+1α2i −
θ˜ 2i+1α
2
i β 2i
φi+ θ˜i+1β 2i
; (21)
θˆi = θi+ θˆi+1α2i −
(
θ˜ 2i+1α
2
i β 2i
φi+ θ˜i+1β 2i
+(θˆi+1− θ˜i+1)α2i
)
λ −1
λ
;
(22)
pi∗i = g
∗
i (bi) = ε
′ = ε; (23)
δ 2∗i = g
∗
i (bi) =
ε2σ2i
λ −1 ; (24)
κ∗i = f
∗
i (bi) =−
θ˜i+1αiβi(λ −1)
(φi+ θ˜i+1β 2i )λε
; (25)
ρ∗i = f
∗
i (bi) =−
θ˜i+1αiβiµi
(φi+ θ˜i+1β 2i )λ
. (26)
Corollary 1: If ε ′ = ε 6= 0, the value function induced by
the unique pure strategy SPE is
VNi (bi) =−θ˜iµ2i − θˆiσ2i −
N
∑
j=i+1
θˆ jω2j−1. (27)
The proofs of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 are provided in
the appendix.
Property 2: It follows from (20)-(22) that for 1≤ i≤ N,
θˆi ≥ θ˜i > 0. (28)
Remark 2: We can make the following observations based
on Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.
• Since the LQG control can be seen as the best response of
any given (adversarial manipulated) observation model,
it is sufficient to consider a pure agent strategy in the
form of an affine function for an SPE of the ALQG
game with a pure adversarial strategy.
• It follows from (24) that a rational adversary will always
apply a manipulation with the largest variance.
• The value function VNi consists of a constant term and
two separable terms depending on the mean µi and the
variance σ2i of the belief, which allows a closed form
solution for arbitrary N.
Time-invariant system: We now turn to the asymptotic
analysis of a time-invariant system, i.e., αi = α 6= 0, βi =
β 6= 0, ω2i = ω2 > 0, θi = θ > 0, and φi = φ > 0 for i ≥ 1,
and we let N→∞. Let us define the mapping L :R2≥0→R2≥0
as
L(x,y) =
(
θ +
φα2x
φ +β 2x
,θ +
φα2x
φ +β 2x
λ −1
λ
+α2y
1
λ
)
.
(29)
Observe that L is effectively the coefficient update (20)-
(22) for the time-invariant model. In what follows, we first
characterize L and furthermore the pure strategy SPE of the
ALQG game in the asymptotic regime.
Proposition 2: Let λ > α2. Then the mapping L admits a
least fixed point (θ˜ , θˆ) ∈ R2≥0, for which
lim
n→∞L
n(0,0) = L(θ˜ , θˆ) = (θ˜ , θˆ), (30)
with Ln(0,0), L(L(· · ·(L(L︸ ︷︷ ︸
n L-mappings
(0,0))) · · ·)).
Proof: We start the proof by observing that the mapping
L is order-preserving. That is, for all (x,y), (x′,y′) ∈ R2≥0
satisfying (x,y) 4 (x′,y′), i.e., x ≤ x′ and y ≤ y′, we have
L(x,y)4 L(x′,y′). This can be easily shown by analyzing (29).
Furthermore, the fixed point equation L(θ˜ , θˆ)= (θ˜ , θˆ) has a
unique solution on R2≥0 if and only if λ >α2. Since L is order-
preserving, the convergence result limn→∞Ln(0,0) = (θ˜ , θˆ)
follows from Kleene’s fixed point theorem [21].
Analytical expressions for θ˜ and θˆ can be obtained by
solving the equation L(θ˜ , θˆ) = (θ˜ , θˆ). Then, the following
theorem follows from Theorem 1 and Proposition 2.
Theorem 2: Let λ > α2, ε ′ = ε 6= 0, and N → ∞. Then
the ALQG game of the time-invariant model has a stationary
SPE in pure strategies as: For i≥ 1,
pi∗i = g
∗
i (bi) = ε; (31)
δ 2∗i = g
∗
i (bi) =
ε2σ2i
λ −1 ; (32)
κ∗i = f
∗
i (bi) =−
θ˜αβ (λ −1)
(φ + θ˜β 2)λε
; (33)
ρ∗i = f
∗
i (bi) =−
θ˜αβµi
(φ + θ˜β 2)λ
. (34)
Proof: Since ε ′ = ε 6= 0, a unique SPE in pure strategies
exists and the SPE strategies are given in Theorem 1. Since
λ > α2 and N→ ∞, it follows from Proposition 2 that θ˜i, θˆi
converge to θ˜ , θˆ , respectively. This leads to the stationary
SPE in Theorem 2.
Interestingly, for this stationary SPE in pure strategies we
can obtain the expected average reward per stage in steady
state in closed form.
Corollary 2: Let b1 , N (µ1,σ21 ) with bounded mean
and variance. For the stationary SPE in pure strategies in
Theorem 2, the expected average reward per stage in steady
state is independent of the initial belief and is given by
lim
N→∞
VN1 (b1)
N
=−θˆω2. (35)
Proof: This result follows from Corollary 1, Proposi-
tion 2, and Theorem 2.
4
C. Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies
The previous results show that a pure strategy SPE does
not exist if there are multiple choices of the coefficient pii
for the adversary. We thus turn to the analysis of SPE in
behavioral strategies.
Theorem 3: Let N ≥ 2 and ε ′ < 0 < ε . Then for 1≤ i≤N,
θ˜i and θˇi are as given by (21), and
θ˜N+1 = θˇN+1 = 0, (36)
θˇi = θi+ θˇi+1α2i − (θˇi+1− θ˜i+1)α2i
λ −1
λ
. (37)
Furthermore, there is a continuum of SPEs in behavioral
strategies. Each SPE in the i-th stage consists of a behavioral
strategy of the adversary and a pure strategy of the agent that
satisfies
S(g∗i |bi),
{
(pii,δ 2i ) : δ
2
i =
pi2i σ2i
λ −1
}
⊆Ai(bi,ε ′,ε,λ ); (38)
||S(g∗i |bi)|| ≥ 2; (39)
Eg∗i (Πi) = 0; (40)
(κ∗i ,ρ
∗
i ) = f
∗
i (bi) =
(
0,− θ˜i+1αiβiµi
φi+ θ˜i+1β 2i
)
. (41)
Interestingly, this SPE is a babbling equilibrium in which
the agent’s action is based on its belief, not on the manipulated
state. Nonetheless, the value of the game depends on the
adversarial manipulation, as shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 3: Let ε ′ < 0 < ε . For any SPE in behavioral
strategies, we have
VNi (bi) =−θ˜iµ2i − θˇiσ2i −
N
∑
j=i+1
θˇ jω2j−1. (42)
The proofs of Theorem 3 and Corollary 3 are given in the
appendix.
Property 3: It follows from the update rules (20)-(22) and
(36)-(37) that for all 1≤ i≤ N,
θˇi ≥ θˆi ≥ θ˜i > 0. (43)
Remark 3: We can make the following observations based
on Theorem 3 and Corollary 3.
• It is sufficient for the agent to use a pure affine strategy
against a behavioral strategy of the adversary.
• Although the adversary cannot use pii = 0, the behavioral
strategy g∗i needs to achieve zero-mean of the random
coefficient Πi.
• A rational adversary will always use a manipulation with
the largest variance.
• From Property 3, the value (42) of an SPE in behavioral
strategies is always less than or equal to the value (27)
of a pure strategy SPE.
Time-invariant system: We again turn to the time-
invariant system for N → ∞. Let us define the mapping
J : R2≥0→ R2≥0 as
J(x,y) =
(
θ +
φα2x
φ +β 2x
,θ +α2x
λ −1
λ
+α2y
1
λ
)
. (44)
Observe that J is effectively the coefficient update rule (21),
(36), (37) for the time-invariant system. In what follows, we
characterize J and the stationary SPEs in behavioral strategies
for the ALQG game.
Proposition 3: Let λ > α2. Then the mapping J admits a
least fixed point (θ˜ , θˇ) ∈ R2≥0, for which
lim
n→∞J
n(0,0) = J(θ˜ , θˇ) = (θ˜ , θˇ). (45)
The proof of Proposition 3 follows using the arguments in
the proof of Proposition 2.
Theorem 4: Let λ > α2, ε ′ < 0 < ε , and N → ∞. Then
the ALQG game of the time-invariant model has a stationary
SPE in behavioral strategies as: For i≥ 1,
g∗i
(
pii = ε ′, δ 2i =
ε ′2σ2i
λ −1
∣∣∣∣bi)= εε− ε ′ ; (46)
g∗i
(
pii = ε, δ 2i =
ε2σ2i
λ −1
∣∣∣∣bi)=− ε ′ε− ε ′ ; (47)
(κ∗i ,ρ
∗
i ) = f
∗
i (bi) =
(
0,− θ˜αβµi
φ + θ˜β 2
)
. (48)
Corollary 4: Let b1 ,N (µ1,σ21 ) with bounded mean and
variance. For the stationary SPE in behavioral strategies in
Theorem 4, the expected average reward per stage in steady
state is independent of the initial belief and is given by
lim
N→∞
VN1 (b1)
N
=−θˇω2. (49)
The proofs of Theorem 4 and Corollary 4 are based on
Theorem 3, Corollary 3, and Proposition 3, and follow from
similar arguments as used in the proofs of Theorem 2 and
Corollary 2. Observe that Corollary 2, Corollary 4, and
Property 3 jointly imply that the expected average agent
reward per stage in steady state is higher when considering
pure strategies, as behavioral strategies allow for more
uncertainty about the attack and thus make the adversary
stronger.
The behavioral strategy of the adversary in Theorem 3
needs to achieve zero-mean of the random coefficient Πi,
which cannot be satisfied if 0≤ ε ′ < ε or ε ′ < ε ≤ 0. In the
following, we study SPE under these conditions.
Theorem 5: Let N ≥ 2. If 0 = ε ′ < ε or if ε ′ < ε = 0, there
is no SPE for the ALQG game.
Theorem 6: Let N = 2. If 0< ε ′ < ε or if ε ′ < ε < 0, there
is a unique SPE in behavioral strategies for the ALQG game:
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For any belief b1 ,N (µ1,σ21 ),
g∗1
(
pi1 = ε ′, δ 21 =
ε ′2σ21
λ −1
∣∣∣∣b1)= εε ′+ ε ; (50)
g∗1
(
pi1 = ε, δ 21 =
ε2σ21
λ −1
∣∣∣∣b1)= ε ′ε ′+ ε ; (51)
κ∗1 = f
∗
1 (b1)
(52)
=
−θ2α1β1Eg∗1(Π1)σ21
(φ1 +θ2β 21 )
(
Eg∗1(Π
2
1)
(
µ21 +
λ
λ−1σ
2
1
)
−E2g∗1(Π1)µ
2
1
) ;
(53)
ρ∗1 = f
∗
1 (b1) =−Eg∗1(Π1)µ1κ∗1 −
θ2α1β1µ1
φ1 +θ2β 21
; (54)
for any belief b2 ,N (µ2,σ22 ), g∗2 = g∗1; (κ∗2 ,ρ∗2 ) = f ∗2 (b2) =
(0,0); and
V 21 (b1)
= −
(
θ1 +θ2α21 −
θ 22α
2
1β
2
1
φ1 +θ2β 21
)
µ21 −θ2ω21 − (θ1 +θ2α21 )σ21
+
θ 22α
2
1β
2
1E
2
g∗1
(Π1)σ41
(φ1 +θ2β 21 )
(
Eg∗1(Π
2
1)
(
µ21 +
λ
λ−1σ
2
1
)
−E2g∗1(Π1)µ
2
1
) .
(55)
The proofs of Theorems 5 & 6 are given in the appendix.
Remark 4: Different from the value functions (27) and
(42), the value function (55) cannot be decomposed into
separable terms of mean and variance, which makes the
extension of Theorem 6 to N ≥ 3 difficult.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We illustrate the impact of strategic interaction on a time-
invariant adversarial LQG problem. The parameters used for
the evaluation are shown in Table I.
We start with illustrating the convergence of the mappings
in Propositions 2 and 3. Fig. 3 shows the mappings Ln(0,0)
and Jn(0,0) as functions of the iteration n for λ = 1.5 and
λ = 2. Both mappings increase monotonically starting from
(0,0) and converge to their least fixed points (θ˜ , θˆ) and
(θ˜ , θˇ), respectively, which confirms these propositions.
We continue with the evaluation of stationary SPEs for
the time-invariant system. Fig. 4 shows the expected average
reward per stage for a stationary SPE in pure strategies and
that for a stationary SPE in behavioral strategies. Observe
that the adversarial manipulation capability decreases as the
mutual information lower bound λ increases, and hence the
expected average rewards increase. The results also confirm
Property 3, i.e., the expected average reward per stage for a
TABLE I
LQG MODEL DEFAULT PARAMETERS
Parameter µ1 σ21 α β ω
2 θ φ
Value 0 1 −0.5 −1.5 1 2 1
stationary SPE in behavioral strategies cannot be higher than
that for a stationary SPE in pure strategies.
Next, we assess the importance of strategic interaction on
the agent’s performance, as compared to an agent that is
unaware of the attack [2], [5]. Fig. 5 shows the expected
average reward per stage for a stationary SPE in behavioral
strategies, as per Corollary 4, that for a naive agent under an
optimal adversarial attack, and that for an alert agent under
SPE adversarial behavioral strategy g∗i in Corollary 4, for
−ε ′ = ε > 0. The naive agent is unaware of the adversarial
manipulation, i.e., it uses the optimal LQR strategy (12).
The corresponding optimal stationary adversarial strategy can
be obtained through dynamic programming, and is the pure
strategy:
(pii,δ 2i ) = g
A
i (bi) =
(
−ε, ε
2σ2i
λ −1
)
.
The alert agent suspects an adversary but does not act
strategically despite the presence of an adversary. The
alert agent assumes pˆii = pˆi 6= 0, δˆ 2i = pˆi
2σ2i
λ−1 , and uses the
corresponding best response strategy
(κi,ρi) = fCi (bi) =
(
− θ˜αβ (λ −1)
(φ + θ˜β 2)λpˆi
,− θ˜αβµi
(φ + θ˜β 2)λ
)
.
The figure shows that the expected average reward per
stage of the naive agent is always lower than that for the
SPE. Clearly, as the mutual information lower bound λ
increases, the adversarial manipulation capability becomes
weaker and the expected average rewards per stage increase.
At the same time, we can observe that if the bound ε of
the manipulation coefficient is higher then the adversarial
manipulation capability becomes stronger and therefore the
expected average reward per stage of the naive agent decreases.
Note that the limit of the expected average reward per stage of
the naive agent does not exist when ε is larger than a threshold
due to the resulting instability of the control system. The poor
performance of the naive agent is consistent with recent works
on adversarial DRL [2], [5], where the naive DRL agents
were found to perform poorly against strategic adversaries.
The results for the SPE show, however, that an agent that is
aware of the adversary can adjust its strategy to be resilient
to adversarial attack. The figure also shows that the expected
average reward per stage of the alert agent is always lower
than that for the SPE since the alert agent does not adjust
its best response strategically to the SPE adversarial strategy.
Different from the SPE and the naive agent, it is interesting
to observe that the alert agent’s performance deteriorates as
the adversarial constraint λ increases. This is due to that the
alert agent’s strategy fCi deviates more from the SPE strategy
f ∗i , as shown in Corollary 4, as λ increases.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed a game theoretic model to capture the strategic
interaction, information asymmetry and system dynamics for
LQG control under adversarial input subject to a mutual
information constraint. We characterized the subgame perfect
equilibria in pure strategies and in behavioral strategies,
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Fig. 3. θ˜n, θˆn, θˇn computed as Ln(0,0) and
Jn(0,0) v.s. the number of iterations n, for λ =
1.5 and λ = 2 (λ > α2).
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Fig. 4. Expected average reward per stage
v.s. mutual information constraint λ , for sta-
tionary SPEs in pure strategies and behavioral
strategies.
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Fig. 5. Expected average reward per stage for
stationary SPE in behavioral strategies, that for
a naive agent, and that for an alert agent v.s.
mutual information constraint λ .
including stationary equilibria for time-invariant systems.
Our results show that if an equilibrium exists then the
agent can use an affine, pure strategy, but randomization
enables the adversary to construct more powerful attacks,
under a wider range of parameters, and forces the agent
into a babbling equilibrium. Our numerical results show the
importance of strategic interaction for LQG control, and
highlight that an agent that is aware of an adversarial attack
can be designed resilient. Our work could be extended in
a number of interesting directions, including considering a
non-scalar state dynamic system, and relaxing the assumption
that the adversarial strategy is revealed to the agent after each
stage.
APPENDIX
A. Proofs of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
Proof: We prove the result using backward dynamic
programming. Recall that there is no feasible adversarial
strategy for ε ′ = ε = 0. Thus, it is sufficient to consider the
cases ε ′ 6= ε or ε ′ = ε 6= 0. In stage N the value function for
bN can be expressed as
VNN (bN) =−θ˜Nµ2N− θˆNσ2N , (56)
where θ˜N = θˆN = θN from the update rules (20)-(22). The pure
strategies, which form an SPE and achieve the value function,
consist of any pure strategy g∗N satisfying the adversarial
constraints (13)-(14), and the dominant pure strategy
(κ∗N ,ρ
∗
N) = f
∗
N(bN) = (0,0). (57)
In stage N−1, the Q-function of using piN−1 6= 0, δ 2N−1,
κN−1, and ρN−1 given a belief bN−1 is
QNN−1(bN−1,piN−1,δ
2
N−1,κN−1,ρN−1)
= −θN−1E(S2N−1)−φN−1E(A2N−1)
− θ˜NE(Λµ(bN−1,piN−1,δ 2N−1, SˆN−1,AN−1))2
− θˆNΛν(bN−1,piN−1,δ 2N−1)
= − (θN−1 + θ˜Nα2N−1)µ2N−1− θˆNω2N−1
− (θN−1 + θˆNα2N−1)σ2N−1
− (φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1)(piN−1κN−1µN−1 +ρN−1)2
−2θ˜NαN−1βN−1µN−1(piN−1κN−1µN−1 +ρN−1)
+(θˆN− θ˜N)α2N−1
pi2N−1σ
2
N−1
pi2N−1σ
2
N−1 +δ
2
N−1
σ2N−1
− (φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1)κ2N−1(pi2N−1σ2N−1 +δ 2N−1)
−2θ˜NαN−1βN−1piN−1κN−1σ2N−1, (58)
where the expectations are induced by the given bN−1, piN−1,
δ 2N−1, κN−1, and ρN−1.
Given bN−1, piN−1 6= 0, δ 2N−1, and κN−1, the Q-function
QNN−1 is a concave quadratic function of ρN−1. As the best
response to maximize the agent reward, we can substitute
ρN−1 in terms of bN−1, piN−1, and κN−1 as
ρN−1 =−piN−1κN−1µN−1− θ˜NαN−1βN−1φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1
µN−1. (59)
Thus, it is sufficient to consider the Q-function
QNN−1(bN−1,piN−1,δ
2
N−1,κN−1)
= −
(
θN−1 + θ˜Nα2N−1−
θ˜ 2Nα2N−1β
2
N−1
φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1
)
µ2N−1
− (θN−1 + θˆNα2N−1)σ2N−1− θˆNω2N−1
+(θˆN− θ˜N)α2N−1
pi2N−1σ
2
N−1
pi2N−1σ
2
N−1 +δ
2
N−1
σ2N−1
− (φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1)κ2N−1(pi2N−1σ2N−1 +δ 2N−1)
−2θ˜NαN−1βN−1piN−1κN−1σ2N−1. (60)
As shown in Property 1, the belief variance is always
positive. Therefore, given bN−1, piN−1 6= 0, and δ 2N−1, the
Q-function QNN−1 is a concave quadratic function of κN−1,
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and the best response of the agent in terms of κN−1 for bN−1,
piN−1, and δ 2N−1 can be expressed as
κN−1 =−
θ˜NαN−1βN−1piN−1σ2N−1
(φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1)(pi
2
N−1σ
2
N−1 +δ
2
N−1)
6= 0. (61)
Given bN−1, piN−1 6= 0, and κN−1 6= 0, the Q-function QNN−1
is a decreasing function of δ 2N−1. The best response of the
adversary in terms of δ 2N−1 for bN−1 and piN−1 is thus
δ 2N−1 =
pi2N−1σ
2
N−1
λ −1 . (62)
Consequently, it is sufficient to consider the Q-function
QNN−1(bN−1,piN−1,κN−1)
= −
(
θN−1 + θ˜Nα2N−1−
θ˜ 2Nα2N−1β
2
N−1
φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1
)
µ2N−1
− (θN−1 + θˆNα2N−1)σ2N−1− θˆNω2N−1
+(θˆN− θ˜N)α2N−1
λ −1
λ
σ2N−1
− (φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1)κ2N−1
λ
λ −1pi
2
N−1σ
2
N−1
−2θ˜NαN−1βN−1piN−1κN−1σ2N−1. (63)
The pure strategies (g∗N−1, f
∗
N−1) form an SPE if pi
∗
N−1 =
g∗N−1(bN−1) and κ
∗
N−1 = f
∗
N−1(bN−1) satisfy
pi∗N−1 = arg minε ′≤piN−1≤ε,piN−1 6=0
QNN−1(bN−1,piN−1,κ
∗
N−1), (64)
κ∗N−1 = arg maxκN−1∈R
QNN−1(bN−1,pi
∗
N−1,κN−1). (65)
If ε ′ = ε 6= 0, pi∗N−1 = ε = ε ′ = g∗N−1(bN−1) is a dominant
adversarial strategy. Therefore, the SPE must exist. The
pure strategies (g∗N−1, f
∗
N−1) can be obtained by substituting
pi∗N−1 = ε into (59), (61), and (62) as
δ 2∗N−1 = g
∗
N−1(bN−1) =
ε2σ2N−1
λ −1 ;
κ∗N−1 = f
∗
N−1(bN−1) =−
θ˜NαN−1βN−1(λ −1)
(φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1)λε
;
ρ∗N−1 = f
∗
N−1(bN−1) =−
θ˜NαN−1βN−1µN−1
(φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1)λ
.
The value function VNN−1(bN−1) can be obtained by substitut-
ing pi∗N−1 and κ
∗
N−1 into the Q-function (63) as
VNN−1(bN−1) =−θ˜N−1µ2N−1− θˆN−1σ2N−1− θˆNω2N−1.
Let us now consider the case ε ′ 6= ε . Assume that there exists
an SPE with pi∗N−1 = g
∗
N−1(bN−1) 6= 0. As the best response,
solving (65) leads to κ∗N−1 = − θ˜NαN−1βN−1(λ−1)(φN−1+θ˜Nβ 2N−1)λpi∗N−1 . For all
piN−1 6= pi∗N−1 and piN−1 6= 0 we have
QNN−1(bN−1,pi
∗
N−1,κ
∗
N−1)> Q
N
N−1(bN−1,piN−1,κ
∗
N−1).
Thus, condition (64) cannot hold and hence the assumption
is not true, i.e., there is no pure strategy SPE in this case.
In the remaining stages of the backward dynamic pro-
gramming, we only need to consider the case of ε ′ = ε 6= 0.
Following the same analysis, it follows that the unique SPE
is as given by Theorem 1 and the value function is as given
by Corollary 1.
B. Proofs of Theorem 3 and Corollary 3
Proof: We prove the result by verifying that the given
strategies form an SPE. The dominant pure strategy of the
agent and the value function in the final stage are as shown
in the proofs of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. Note that any
behavioral adversarial strategy satisfying (13)-(14) can be
g∗N since it has no impact on the agent reward. Therefore,
Theorem 3 and Corollary 3 hold in the final stage.
For stage N−1, we first show that it is sufficient to consider
a pure agent strategy with an affine form. A general behavioral
agent strategy fN−1 decides an action aN−1 based on the belief
bN−1 and the observation sˆN−1 with the probability measure
fN−1(aN−1|bN−1, sˆN−1). Given a belief bN−1, a behavioral
adversarial strategy gN−1, an observation sˆN−1, and an action
aN−1 from the support set of a behavioral agent strategy fN−1,
the Q-function is
QNN−1(bN−1,gN−1, sˆN−1,aN−1)
= −θN−1EbN−1(S2N−1)−φN−1a2N−1
− θ˜NEgN−1(Λµ(bN−1,ΠN−1,∆2N−1, sˆN−1,aN−1))2
− θˇNEgN−1(Λν(bN−1,ΠN−1,∆2N−1))
= −θN−1(µ2N−1 +σ2N−1)− (φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1)a2N−1
−2θ˜NEgN−1
(
ΠN−1σ2N−1sˆN−1 +µN−1∆
2
N−1
Π2N−1σ
2
N−1 +∆
2
N−1
)
αN−1βN−1aN−1
− θ˜NEgN−1
(
ΠN−1σ2N−1sˆN−1 +µN−1∆
2
N−1
Π2N−1σ
2
N−1 +∆
2
N−1
)2
α2N−1
− θˇNEgN−1
(
α2N−1σ
2
N−1∆
2
N−1
Π2N−1σ
2
N−1 +∆
2
N−1
)
− θˇNω2N−1, (66)
which is a concave quadratic function of aN−1. As the best
response to maximize the agent reward, the support set of the
behavioral agent strategy is a singleton, i.e., it is sufficient
to use a pure agent strategy, which has an affine form as
aN−1 = −
θ˜NαN−1βN−1EgN−1
(
ΠN−1σ2N−1
Π2N−1σ2N−1+∆2N−1
)
φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1
sˆN−1
−
θ˜NαN−1βN−1EgN−1
(
∆2N−1
Π2N−1σ2N−1+∆2N−1
)
φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1
µN−1.
(67)
Assume that an SPE in behavioral strategies consists
of κ∗N−1 = f
∗
N−1(bN−1) = 0 and ρ
∗
N−1 = f
∗
N−1(bN−1) =
− θ˜NαN−1βN−1µN−1φN−1+θ˜Nβ 2N−1 . Given bN−1, (piN−1,δ
2
N−1) in the support
set of a behavioral adversarial strategy gN−1, κ∗N−1, and ρ
∗
N−1,
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we have the following Q-function:
QNN−1(bN−1,piN−1,δ
2
N−1,κ
∗
N−1,ρ
∗
N−1)
= −
(
θN−1 + θ˜Nα2N−1−
θ˜ 2Nα2N−1β
2
N−1
φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1
)
µ2N−1
− (θN−1 + θˇNα2N−1)σ2N−1− θˇNω2N−1
+(θˇN− θ˜N)α2N−1
pi2N−1σ
2
N−1
pi2N−1σ
2
N−1 +δ
2
N−1
σ2N−1. (68)
From Property 3 and the adversarial constraints (13)-(14), we
have(
piN−1 6= 0,δ 2N−1 =
pi2N−1σ
2
N−1
λ −1
)
= arg min
(piN−1,δ 2N−1)
QNN−1(bN−1,piN−1,δ
2
N−1,κ
∗
N−1,ρ
∗
N−1).
(69)
Therefore, any behavioral adversarial strategy is the best
response of f ∗N−1 if its support set consists of two or more
elements of
(
piN−1 6= 0,δ 2N−1 =
pi2N−1σ2N−1
λ−1
)
.
Assume that an SPE consists of a behavioral ad-
versarial strategy g∗N−1(·|bN−1), which is defined on
a support set containing two or more elements of(
piN−1 6= 0,δ 2N−1 =
pi2N−1σ2N−1
λ−1
)
, and satisfies Eg∗N−1(ΠN−1) =
0. Given bN−1, g∗N−1, κN−1, and ρN−1, we have the following
Q-function:
QNN−1(bN−1,g
∗
N−1,κN−1,ρN−1)
= − (θN−1 + θ˜Nα2N−1)µ2N−1− θˇNω2N−1
−
(
θN−1 + θˇNα2N−1− (θˇN− θ˜N)α2N−1
λ −1
λ
)
σ2N−1
− (φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1)Eg∗N−1(Π2N−1)(
µ2N−1 +
λ
λ −1σ
2
N−1
)
κ2N−1
− (φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1)ρ2N−1
−2θ˜NαN−1βN−1µN−1ρN−1. (70)
The best response of g∗N−1 is(
κN−1 = 0,ρN−1 =− θ˜NαN−1βN−1µN−1φN−1 + θ˜Nβ 2N−1
)
= arg max
(κN−1,ρN−1)
QNN−1(bN−1,g
∗
N−1,κN−1,ρN−1). (71)
It follows from (69) and (71) that a behavioral ad-
versarial strategy g∗N−1(·|bN−1), which is defined on
a support set containing two or more elements of(
piN−1 6= 0,δ 2N−1 =
pi2N−1σ2N−1
λ−1
)
and satisfies Eg∗N−1(ΠN−1) =
0, and a pure agent strategy (κ∗N−1,ρ
∗
N−1) = f
∗
N−1(bN−1) =(
0,− θ˜NαN−1βN−1µN−1φN−1+θ˜Nβ 2N−1
)
form an SPE in stage N−1. Further-
more, the value function in this stage is
VNN−1(bN−1) =−θ˜N−1µ2N−1− θˇN−1σ2N−1− θˇNω2N−1.
Thus, Theorem 3 and Corollary 3 hold in stage N−1.
In the remaining stages of the backward dynamic program-
ming we can always justify that the solution of the SPE in
behavioral strategies from Theorem 3 and the value function
from Corollary 3 hold following the same analysis as used
in stage N−1.
C. Proofs of Theorems 5 and 6
Proof: To prove Theorems 5 and 6, it is sufficient to
consider a two-stage problem, i.e., N = 2. The solution of
the final stage is the same as in the proofs of Theorem 3 and
Corollary 3, and therefore is omitted here. Theorems 5 and 6
hold in the final stage. Furthermore, as shown in the proofs
of Theorem 3 and Corollary 3, it is sufficient to consider a
pure agent strategy with an affine form in the first stage.
Given b1, (pi1,δ 21 ) in the support set of a behavioral
adversarial strategy g1, κ1, and ρ1, the Q-function is
Q21(b1,pi1,δ
2
1 ,κ1,ρ1)
= − (θ1 +θ2α21 )µ21 −θ2ω21 − (θ1 +θ2α21 )σ21
− (φ1 +θ2β 21 )(pi1κ1µ1 +ρ1)2−2θ2α1β1µ1(pi1κ1µ1 +ρ1)
− (φ1 +θ2β 21 )κ21 (pi21σ21 +δ 21 )−2θ2α1β1pi1κ1σ21 . (72)
This Q-function is non-increasing in δ 21 for any given
b1, pi1, κ1, and ρ1. As the best response to minimize
the agent reward, it is sufficient to consider a behavioral
adversarial strategy defined on a non-singleton support set of(
pi1 6= 0,δ 21 = pi
2
1σ
2
1
λ−1
)
.
Given b1, g1 with a non-singleton support set of(
pi1 6= 0,δ 21 = pi
2
1σ
2
1
λ−1
)
, κ1, and ρ1, the Q-function is
Q21(b1,g1,κ1,ρ1)
= − (θ1 +θ2α21 )µ21 −θ2ω21 − (θ1 +θ2α21 )σ21
− (φ1 +θ2β 21 )Eg1(Π21)
(
µ21 +
λ
λ −1σ
2
1
)
κ21
−2(φ1 +θ2β 21 )Eg1(Π1)µ1κ1ρ1− (φ1 +θ2β 21 )ρ21
−2θ2α1β1Eg1(Π1)(µ21 +σ21 )κ1−2θ2α1β1µ1ρ1. (73)
This is a concave quadratic function of ρ1 when b1, g1, and
κ1 are fixed. As the best response to maximize the agent
reward, we can substitute ρ1 with
ρ1 =−Eg1(Π1)µ1κ1−
θ2α1β1µ1
φ1 +θ2β 21
. (74)
Then the Q-function (73) reduces to
Q21(b1,g1,κ1)
= −
(
θ1 +θ2α21 −
θ 22α
2
1β
2
1
φ1 +θ2β 21
)
µ21 −θ2ω21 − (θ1 +θ2α21 )σ21
− (φ1 +θ2β 21 )(
Eg1(Π
2
1)
(
µ21 +
λ
λ −1σ
2
1
)
−E2g1(Π1)µ21
)
κ21
−2θ2α1β1Eg1(Π1)σ21κ1. (75)
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This is also a concave quadratic function of κ1 when b1 and
g1 are fixed. As the best response to maximize the agent
reward, we can substitute κ1 with
κ1 =
−θ2α1β1Eg1(Π1)σ21
(φ1 +θ2β 21 )
(
Eg1(Π21)
(
µ21 +
λ
λ−1σ
2
1
)
−E2g1(Π1)µ21
) .
(76)
Since we consider 0 ≤ ε ′ < ε or ε ′ < ε ≤ 0 and the
behavioral adversarial strategy has a non-singleton support
set, Eg1(Π1) 6= 0 and κ1 6= 0 in these cases.
We then study the support set of a behavioral adversarial
strategy. Given b1,
(
pi1 6= 0,δ 21 = pi
2
1σ
2
1
λ−1
)
in the support set
of a behavioral adversarial strategy g1, κ1 6= 0, and ρ1, the
Q-function is
Q21(b1,pi1,κ1,ρ1)
= − (θ1 +θ2α21 )µ21 −θ2ω21 − (θ1 +θ2α21 )σ21
− (φ1 +θ2β 21 )(pi1κ1µ1 +ρ1)2−2θ2α1β1µ1(pi1κ1µ1 +ρ1)
− (φ1 +θ2β 21 )κ21
λ
λ −1pi
2
1σ
2
1 −2θ2α1β1pi1κ1σ21 . (77)
This is a concave quadratic function of pi1 given b1,
κ1 6= 0, and ρ1. As the best response to minimize the
agent reward, it is sufficient to consider a behavioral
adversarial strategy g1 with the following support set:{(
pi1 = ε ′,δ 21 =
ε ′2σ21
λ−1
)
,
(
pi1 = ε,δ 21 =
ε2σ21
λ−1
)}
.
When 0 = ε ′ < ε or ε ′ < ε = 0, an SPE in behavioral
strategies does not exist since 0 = ε ′ or ε = 0 will lead to a
singleton support set of the behavioral adversarial strategy;
and meanwhile a pure strategy SPE does not exist since
ε ′ 6= ε . This proves Theorem 5.
When 0 < ε ′ < ε or ε ′ < ε < 0, we assume that an SPE
in behavioral strategies consists of
g∗1
(
pi1 = ε ′, δ 21 =
ε ′2σ21
λ −1
∣∣∣∣b1)= p∗;
g∗1
(
pi1 = ε, δ 21 =
ε2σ21
λ −1
∣∣∣∣b1)= 1− p∗;
κ∗1 = f
∗
1 (b1)
=
−θ2α1β1Eg∗1(Π1)σ21
(φ1 +θ2β 21 )
(
Eg∗1(Π
2
1)
(
µ21 +
λ
λ−1σ
2
1
)
−E2g∗1(Π1)µ
2
1
) ;
ρ∗1 = f
∗
1 (b1) =−Eg∗1(Π1)µ1κ∗1 −
θ2α1β1µ1
φ1 +θ2β 21
.
Since the assumed f ∗1 is the best response of the assumed
g∗1, we only need to testify if 0 < p∗< 1 exists such that g∗1
is the best response of f ∗1 , i.e., both pi1 = ε
′ and pi1 = ε are
minimizers of the Q-function Q21(b1,pi1,κ
∗
1 ,ρ
∗
1 ). There is a
unique solution
p∗ =
ε
ε ′+ ε
. (78)
Therefore, there is a unique SPE in behavioral strategies
for the two-stage ALQG game. The strategies and the value
function of the SPE in Theorem 6 can then be obtained easily.
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